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There are better cultural, political, and military histories of this period, but Andreas 
Stucki’s sustained focus on Spanish military doctrine and practice, particularly the 
reconcentration of civilians, sets this book apart and makes it invaluable. 
The scholarship on reconcentration has been scant for several reasons. Cuban 
scholars traditionally stopped at demonizing Weyler and the Spanish in order to jus-
tify their commitment to “Total War.” Americans, with exceptions, do the same thing 
in order to paint the invasion of Cuba and other Spanish colonies in 1898 as a rescue 
operation. In both cases, deeper explorations of the way Cuban civilians were treat-
ed would reveal too much about the role of the Cuban insurgents in the tragedy and 
confuse the convenient narrative about good Cubans and evil Spaniards. Spanish 
scholars have had little interest in examining too closely a frankly disgraceful part 
of the history of modern Spain and sometimes approach the subject apologetically. 
As a result, most people are unaware that reconcentration predated the arrival of 
Weyler in 1896, and that it began organically when both sides, Cuban and Spanish, 
fought to control the population and its resources. Cubans burned crops and Spanish 
towns, forcing civilians to flee into cities or join them in the manigua (pp. 87-88). 
The Spanish burned crops and Cuban towns and forced civilians to relocate to Span-
ish-held territory (pp. 185-189). One of Stucki’s most interesting contributions is 
the attention he gives to the problem of the vast internal migration not caused by 
reconcentration but simply by the cruelty of warfare. In a sense, Weyler’s famous 
orders of reconcentration were simply a more radical version of what had already 
been happening. It had happened before in Cuba and elsewhere and it will happen 
again, because it is part of the nature of insurgency and counterinsurgency (pp. 10-
11). This is not to let Weyler “off the hook,” as it were, but simply to place him in 
some kind of context that makes him and the Spanish regime in Cuba human and 
therefore understandable.
Scholars sometimes make the mistake of conflating reconcentration with the con-
centration camps and gulags of the twentieth century (pp. 13-16). In fact, what hap-
pened in Cuba was completely different, as Stucki argues. It resulted in great suffer-
ing and death. Perhaps ten percent of the population perished (10). Spanish officials 
bear responsibility for this in that they knew from experience that this would be the 
case, for they could not possibly provide adequate rations and they could not under-
stand, much less prevent the diseases that sickened and killed the starving civilian 
population. Despite all of this, however, reconcentration was a military strategy, not 
deliberate murder. The “camps” were mostly just defensible towns (p. 17). Stucki 
notes that the term concentration camp was not really used in Cuba. Instead, terms 
like “pueblos reconcentrados” and “concentrados en ciudades” were common. And 
Stucki rightly prefers to use “poblados fortificados” to describe the “camps” and 
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“reubicación” to describe the process of moving civilians into them. In this context, 
the title in Spanish is a rather odd translation of the 2013 German original. Aufstand 
und Zwangsumsiedlung: Die Kubanishen Unabhängigkeitskrige can be translated 
to English as Rebellion and Forced Relocation: The Cuban Wars of Independence. 
Given his discussion of the inappropriate use of the term “concentration camp,” one 
wonders if Stucki would have preferred some other title in Spanish. 
Reconcentration was not managed in any systematic way. It varied from province to 
province and town to town. Sometimes, towns built barracks to house civilians. Others 
allowed new suburbs to be created. In some towns, reconcentrados slept inside old 
warehouses or other empty buildings. In others, they slept in the open. In some towns, 
they were guarded closely. In others, they freely left during the day to farm, pasture 
livestock, and engage in other sorts of activities designed to sustain themselves. Some-
times, but not always, if their property had not already been destroyed by the Cubans, 
the Spanish allowed them to bring it along. The Spanish army provided rations to the 
reconcentrados, but it was an inefficient and underfunded system that barely worked in 
some places and it was discontinued too soon as part of winding down reconcentration 
under Blanco in late 1897. In any event, all of this bears little resemblance to the camps 
at Auschwitz or Dachau, and Stucki is right to insist on the difference. 
Stucki brings some new sources to bear on his subject. Correspondence and other 
unpublished material from the Biblioteca Nacional in Havana and from the Archivo 
Histórico Provincial de Pinar del Río adds depth and texture to his work. On the 
other hand, I expected to see more use made of these and other Cuban archives, but 
very few of Stucki’s copious endnotes refer to sources in Cuba. Instead, they mostly 
reference well-known materials in the military archives in Madrid and Segovia. In 
part, I believe this is because using archives in Cuba is not an easy thing to do, as 
I know from experience. In part, though, it is because many of the best materials 
bearing on the subject were created by the Spanish and they took it all with them 
when the evacuated Cuba. Stucki uses this archival material to aargue that the Span-
ish military strategy was not as foolish as it was once thought to be. One reads in 
some older histories that the trochas built to isolate the insurgents in the far West and 
in the far East did not work. Cuban documents overwhelmingly tell another story. 
Early in the war the old eastern trocha was a ruin and easy to cross, but by 1896 the 
new western trocha was extremely effective, and the eastern one in the process of 
becoming so (p. 173). Even reconcentration itself “worked” in the sense that by 1897 
the Ejército Libertador had lost most of western Cuba, which really had become “ca-
si-pacificada,” to use Weyler’s unfortunate term (p. 209-214). The old notion that re-
concentration simply created enemies and that the trochas were a defensive measure 
that accomplished nothing of strategic value cannot be sustained by the evidence. On 
the other hand, reconcentration failed in another fundamental respect. The tragedy 
of reconcentration not only cost the lives of thousands of non-combatants in Cuba, it 
also helped to create opposition to the war in Spain and to mobilize public opinion in 
the United States against the Spanish regime in Cuba (p. 215). This last point should 
be emphasized. Two years of yellow journalism about Spanish barbarity -- real and 
otherwise -- played a part in the American decision to go to war with Spain.
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